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The Missing Essential Part
Emergency Provision of Nuclear Weapons for
R C A F Air Defence Command, 1961-1964

S E A N M. M A L O N E Y

Abstract: During the Cold War, Canada acquired aircraft and missiles
capable of delivering nuclear weapons but no agreement existed for Canadian
access to those weapons. The Diefenbaker government, elected in 1957, was
suspicious of anything that might compromise Canadian sovereignty and
harboured a small cadre of anti-nuclear members in its ranks. During a series
of incidents, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Royal Canadian
A ir Force deployed five squadrons of CF -101B Voodoo interceptors and two
squadrons of B o m a r c B heavy surface-to-air missiles to protect North
America as part of the North American A ir Defence Command agreement.
This study examines the three available options for the emergency deployment
of nuclear weapons to Canada and their viability in light of new information.
t h e C o l d War, Canada acquired aircraft capable of
delivering nuclear weapons. In the midst of these complicated
and expensive processes, the Diefenbaker government was elected in
1.957 and re-examined the Canadian defence programme. Negotiations
began between the Canadian armed services and their American
counterparts for access to the nuclear munitions for which these
aircraft were designed. The negotiations, however, became entangled
in a mire of political controversy. The Diefenbaker government,
suspicious of anything that might compromise Canadian sovereignty
and harbouring a small cadre of anti-nuclear members in its ranks,
delayed dealing with the issue amid increased attacks by the Liberal
opposition, who, when in office, had initiated the strategic process
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that demanded the procurement of the aircraft that required nuclear
munitions.
These deliberations took place against an increasingly apocalyptic
backdrop. The Soviet Union precipitated an extremely dangerous
crisis over access to West which threatened to escalate into war. As
that situation waned, another confrontation emerged in 1962 when
the Soviet Union deployed intermediate and medium-range ballistic
missiles and tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba.
During these crises, the Royal Canadian Air Force (r c a f ) had
five squadrons of CF-101B Voodoo interceptors and two squadrons of
Bom arc B heavy surface-to-air missiles from the r c a f ’s Air Defence
Command (a d c ) dedicated to protect North America as part of the
North American Air Defence Command (n o r a d ) agreement.
Without a formal agreement between the two governments, access
to nuclear warheads for these forces was problematic. During the
course of events, however, provisions for the emergency deployment
of nuclear weapons were examined by both countries. This took
three forms : the first was what we would today call “just in time”
delivery of complete weapons from US bases as a crisis escalated. The
second called for incomplete nuclear weapons to be stored in Canada
with the delivery of a “‘missing essential part’” from US bases to
be inserted once warning of an attack was given. The third was the
deployment of American aircraft equipped with nuclear weapons to
defend Canada. Up to now, the ability of the US Air Force (u s a f )
to implement these options has been obscured by decades of secrecy.
This present study will examine these options and their viability in
light given availability of newly available information.1

1 The general outline of the emergency provision arrangements initially was based
on primary sources requested by the author for declassification and depicted in the
author’s PhD dissertation “Learning to Love the Bomb: Canadian Nuclear Weapons
and Cold War Strategy 1951-1970” which was researched and written in 1993
97, defended in 1998, and published by Potomac Books in 2007. John Clearwater
notes the locations of storage facilities in his 1998 work Canadian Nuclear Weapons
(Vanwell, 1998) which according to his website was written while he was employed
at Department of National Defence as a “specialist in access to information matters”
but he does not examine emergency provision arrangements in it to the same level
of detail or place it in any significant historical context. “The Missing Essential
Part” article takes into account new information developed by the author and is
an elaboration on the discussion in “Learning to Love the Bomb.” I would also like
to thank Bill Burr at the National Security Archive for perusing this article and
providing suggestions.
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CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE 101

North American air defence planning started after the detonation
of the first Soviet nuclear weapon in 1949 and continued after the
confirmation that Soviet bomber forces were forward-deploying TU-4
piston-engine bombers to bases capable of reaching North America
in 1952-1954. Anticipating that jet bombers and thermonuclear
weapons would replace them, a series of high-priority air defence
projects emerged in United States and Canada by the early 1950s.
These included early warning radar systems, command and control
and communications systems, fighter-interception forces, and guided
missile systems.
By 1952 joint discussions envisioned an integrated air defence
system by the late 1950s, knowing full that many technologies required
were not mature. The nature of the threat, demonstrated by the test
of an air-droppable Soviet thermonuclear weapon in 1955, forced the
planners to undertake these projects simultaneously. Two of these
involved the nuclearization of missiles and fighter aircraft weapons
systems. Prior to this air defence forces relied on interceptors equipped
with machine guns and free-flight rockets. These included the CF100 in Canada and the F-80, F-84, and F-86 aircraft in American
service.2 With technological breakthroughs in small diameter “sealed
pit” nuclear weapon designs, it was possible to equip interceptors
with nuclear air-to-air weapons. Similarly, the surface-to-air missiles
under development were modified to accept nuclear warheads.3 It was
by the mid-1950s fully understood in the r c a f and the u s a f that
the next generation of aircraft and missiles would use small nuclear
weapons as their primary kill mechanisms.
The integration of the Canadian and US air defence programmes
was deemed to be an American priority in 1949. At the same time
it was understood in American policy circles that there were issues
of national sovereignty that demanded delicate handling.4 It was

2 Kenneth Schaffel, The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of
Continental Air Defense 1945-1960 (Washington DC: GPO, 1991), ch.6.
3 Previously, nuclear weapons were extremely large “open pit” designs that
required the in-flight insertion of the plutonium core for them to operate. FOIA,
“ADC Historical Study No. 21, Bomarc and Nuclear Armament 1951-1963,” and
“ADC Historical Study No. 20, “Nuclear Armament : Its Acquisition, Control and
Application to Manned Interceptors 1951-1963.”
4 This exceptionally complicated historical process has for the purposes of this
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recognized on both sides of the table that the air defence systems
as a whole existed to protect the u s a f ’s Strategic Air Command’s
forces, that the deterrent capability of s a c rested on the reduction of
its vulnerability, and the larger issue of deterring aggressive Soviet
activity generally was based on this deterrent system. However, it
was simply not acceptable that the United States should take over
the defence of Canada. Nor did the Americans want to, despite the
assertions and shrill cries of nationalists in Canada.5
It was thus up to Canada to determine its level of involvement.
Canada looked at the construction of an indigenous interceptor force,
purchasing a complementary surface-to-air missile force compatible
with American systems, and manning some form of integrated
detection and direction system. By at least 1956 it was evident
to Canadian planners that nuclear warheads were going to be the
norm for the air defence system. The accidental release of classified
Douglas Aircraft reports to Canadian authorities that related to their
MB-1 Genie nuclear air-to-air rocket contributed to r c a f interest.6
By May 1957 active discussion about arming the future interceptor
force based on the CF-105 Arrow aircraft with MB-1 was underway.7
This course of action was confirmed when the entire r c a f leadership
witnessed Shot j o h n , the live test of an MB-1 Genie nuclear air-toair rocket in Nevada during the Plumbob test series in July 1957.8
As the MB-1 was about to enter service in the US Air Force,
special care had to be taken for its transport and storage. It was
not simply a matter of stockpiling the rockets in a hanger on a given
base. The highly-destructive nature and technological sophistication
of nuclear weapons required exceptionally specialized transport and
maintenance procedures. The weapons design had to be safeguarded.

article been dramatically compressed. It is discussed in great detail in the author’s
Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Cold War Strategy and Nuclear Weapons
1951-1970 (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2007).
5 US National Archives and Records Administration [NARA] RG 59 file E3077
250/62/30/3 Box 1 (1 Sep 1961) Canadian-American Relations Committee,
“Canadian-American Relations"
6 ATI (27 August 1956) memo CCOS to CJS(W) “Air to Air Atomic Weapons” ; (24
September 1956) memo JSW PC to CCOS, “Air-to-Air Atomic Weapons.”
7 DHH file 79/429 vol. 7A, (1 Mar 57) AM TS “Divisional Items of Interest.”
8 Library and Archives Canada [LAC] RG 24 vol 21444 file 1894.2 (Oct 57) “A
Report on the Activities Connected with the Formation, Operations and Close-out
of the Canadian Administration Group during Operation PLUMBBOB 1 May 57-1
Oct 57 at Camp Desert Rock, Nevada Test Site.”
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Safety standards and accountability were on an order of magnitude
higher than conventional weapons. A single person now had the
capability of generating immense destruction and steps had to be
taken to eliminate that possibility, thus command, control and alert
procedures had to be completely redesigned.
As a result, nuclear weapons could not be transferred to the
r c a f like conventional weapons as there were stringent legal aspects
regarding the deployment and use of nuclear munitions. To access
these systems, and it was not just the warheads but all aspects of
the nuclear endeavor, required a series of agreements related to each
type of delivery system. Only then could training commence and
information on the systems flow between the two air forces. And,
if the aircraft were made in Canada, they had to be certified for
nuclear weapons delivery by the appropriate authorities at Kirtland
Air Force Base in New Mexico. These processes all stalled after the
Diefenbaker government was elected in 1957.

AIR DEFENCE DISPOSITIONS: THE TYRANNY OF GEOGRAPHY

The first u s a f interceptors equipped with MB-1 Genie rockets on
alert were nine F-89J Scorpions at Hamilton Air Force Base (a f b )
near San Francisco and six F-89J’s at Wurtsmith a f b in Michigan
on 1 January 1957. Twelve bases across the United States were
surveyed for MB-1 storage, with construction commencing at nine
locations in 1956. Only four were ready by early 1957 : Hamilton,
Wurtsmith, Dover in Delaware and K.I. Sawyer in Michigan. With
the planned deployment of the F-101B Voodoo and F-106A Delta
Dart interceptors in 1960-61, up to 30 bases in total were scheduled
for MB-1 storage.9
At the same time, the Bom arc surface-to-air missile system
entered service. Initially designed to ring the perimeter of the United
States, the programme was eventually cut back to ten sites, each
housing 28 missiles.10
One must appreciate the geographical issues facing u s a f air
defence planning at this time. American heavy industry at the time

9 FOIA, “AD C Historical Study No. 20, “Nuclear Armament: Its Acquisition,
Control and Application to Manned Interceptors 1951-1963"
10 Schaffel, The Emerging Shield, ch.8.
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was concentrated in the Chicago - Ohio Valley and the Michigan area.
There was also a “high tech” corridor from Boston to Buffalo. The
s a c base network expanded to include nine major bomber bases from
North Dakota to Maine. The US Navy’s nuclear submarine facilities
were located in New England. To the south was the command and
control hub, Washington DC. The only route that Soviet bombers
could take to get at these target complexes was from the Kola
Peninsula, over Greenland, Baffin Island, Labrador, Quebec, and
then Ontario. On the west coast, bombers based in eastern Siberia
were even closer to their targets. To attack the aerospace industry,
arrayed from Washington state to California, and the myriad of s a c
bases located in both states, Soviet forces had to cross Alaska, then
British Columbia.
The complicating problem for the air defence forces were the
portion of Ontario that jutted southwards into the United States ;
the proximity of Quebec’s major cities to Vermont; and the location
of a major s a c base on the border with New Brunswick at Caribou,
Maine. Interception of bomber aircraft had to take place as far away
as possible from the targets, not only because u s a f interceptors were
equipped with nuclear weapons, but because the bombers carried
thermonuclear weapons that could generate irradiated craters two
miles in diameter. That state of affairs pushed the intercept line north
as far as possible and produced a requirement to have interceptor
forces cover those spaces.
The u s a f sited interceptor forces along the border, with seven
fighter and Bom arc facilities in Minnesota and Michigan, and six
more from New York through Maine to Massachusetts. Six fighter
bases covered the northwest from Washington to North Dakota.11
The r c a f ’s Air Defence Command had C F -ioo’s based at Comox,
BC ; Cold Lake, Alberta ; North Bay and Ottawa in Ontario, and
St. Hubert and Bagotville in Quebec.12 The r c a f ’ s dispositions gave
depth on the west coast and to some extent for what became known as
the “Niagara Triangle.” There were four additional u s a f interceptor
squadrons that afforded even greater depth: Thule, Greenland; Goose
Bay, Labrador ; Stephenville, Newfoundland ; and Keflavik, Iceland.
Similarly air defence forces in Alaska gave the US west coast depth
of coverage.

11 Schaffel, The Emerging Shield, 230.
12 Larry Milberry, The AVRO CF-100 (Toronto: CANAV Books, 1981), 177.
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The thorny issue of deploying MB-1 Genies to overseas bases
posed questions as to the viability of the four bases on the northeast
approaches. First, there was the questionable legality of the presence
of Thule Air Force Base in Greenland vis-a-vis the already aggravated
Danish-American relations. Second, Iceland, was leaning towards
neutrality and there were similar sensitivities. Third, the American
use of bases in Newfoundland and Labrador was a sensitive issue
dating back to the Second World War. That said, there were US Air
Force interceptor squadrons stationed at all four locations. Storage
for nuclear air defence weapons was constructed at Goose Bay and
Thule.

NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE FOR AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE
FORCES

Each u s a f interceptor base contained a nuclear weapons storage
area and a quick reaction alert facility designed by the Black and
Veatch Company in Kansas.13 The MB-1 Genies were kept in thirtybay Multi-Cubicle Magazine Storage ( m c m s ) buildings, with one
MB-1 mounted on a MF-9 trailer in each bay behind an alarmprotected “garage door of doom.” Each bay was made of concrete
with a frangible roof. If there were an accident this would direct
any blast upwards and localize any plutonium contamination.14 Air
Defense Command bases with nuclear-capable interceptors generally
featured four m c m s buildings (a limited number of bases had three,
others had five or six) for an average of 120 MB-1 Genies per base.15
There was also a warhead checkout building. The m c m s s were built
starting in late 1956 with construction delays well into 1958 affecting
operational capability for the Air Defense Command.16

13 HQ Air Combat Command Langley Air Force Base, Virginia “Cold War
Infrastructure for Air Defense : The Fighter and Command Missions, November
1999,” 76- 77.
14 Author’s site survey of the former Griffiss AFB Weapons Storage Area ADC
storage section.
15 Author’s Google Earth survey of former AD C bases in the continental United States.
16 FOIA, “ADC Historical Study No. 20, “Nuclear Armament : Its Acquisition,
Control and Application to Manned Interceptors 1951-1963.” See also Bill Green,
The First Line: Air Defense of the Northeast 1952 to 1960 (Fairview: Wonderhorse
Publications, 1994), 365.
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One problem associated with MB-1 Genie storage in the m c m s
structures related to the need to protect the rocket’s propellant from
freezing. Early m c m s buildings had to be modified with heating and
temperature measurement systems. These changes were made at
Goose Bay; Griffiss, N Y; Glasgow and Grand Forks on the prairies;
Duluth, Minnesota; and Loring and Dow in Maine. Later an electrical
heating blanket system was incorporated into the MB-1 design which
allowed the weapons to be “plugged in” in the bays and kept at
optimum temperatures.17
Four interceptors at each base were kept on alert in a protected
hanger, one pair with conventional weapons for identification flights,
and a pair loaded with M B -is in case of bomber attack. Once F -io iB ’s
took over from the F-8gJ’s the Voodoos conducted identification
flights while loaded with M B -is.18
As for the Bom arcs, the W 40 warhead was mounted in the
missile airframe. Each site maintained 28 missiles. A separate
warhead maintenance building had m c m s -like bays with space for
eight warheads but it is unlikely that there were more than a pair
of spare warheads per site. For the Bom arc sites located in the
northeast, there appear to be no additional storage areas co-located
with the missile coffin launchers.19 The W 40 warhead was a more
sophisticated system that had special maintenance requirements. It
was a boosted Mk 28 warhead which required tritium gas to function
and thus the gas had to be recharged from time to time as, it turned
out, it prematurely aged.20
Nuclear weapons like the W 25 in the M B -i and the W 40 in the
Bom arc required second and third-line maintenance. Designed at
the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and built at Burlington, Iowa
and Pantex, Texas,21 it is not clear where the intermediate storage
facilities that the weapons were shipped to prior to deployment to the

17 Author’s survey of Griffiss WSA. I’d like to thank Larissa Reise for pointing out
the remains of the temperature control equipment. See also “AD C Historical Study
No. 20, “Nuclear Armament : Its Acquisition, Control and Application to Manned
Interceptors i95i-i963.”
18 Green, The First Line, 465.
19 Author’s site survey of the North Bay Bomarc site; Author’s Google Earth survey
of former Bomarc sites.
20 Chuck Hansen, US Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (New York : Orion
Books, i987), 220.
21 Rebecca Ullrich, “Tech Area II : A History,” Contractor Report SAND98-i6i7
Sandia National Laboratories, July i998 pp. i i - i2 .
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This screen shot shows the M B -1 Genie. To the immediate left o f the rocket airframe is
the seldom-seen W -25 warhead. Note its relatively small size. In less than a decade nuclear
weapons shrunk from the huge Fat Man devices to one capable o f being launched from a
fighter aircraft. [Author]

operational sites. Eventually, the 3079th Aviation Depot Wing of Air
Material Command took custody of the warheads. This organization
maintained operational storage sites co-located at five s a c bomber
bases: Loring a f b in Maine (Site Easy) ; Ellsworth a f b in South
Dakota (Site Fox); Fairchild a f b in Washington (Site George); Travis
a f b in California (Site How) ; and Westover a f b in Massachusetts
(Site Item).22 These facilities usually catered to the s a c bomber force,
but, as more bombers came on line and weapons got smaller, s a c
dispersed to more bases, each with their own weapons storage area.
Each of the original Operational Storage Sites contained in excess of
twenty large storage “igloos,” each capable of holding, for example,
40 to 50 B-61 gravity bombs. In other words, there was more than
enough space to house transient W 25 and W 40 warheads in their
55-gallon-drum-like containers.23
Three transport squadrons that belonged to the 3079th Aviation
Depot Wing transported the weapons. These were the 28th Air
Transport Squadron (Special) at Hill a f b in Utah ; the 19th Air

22 See organization chart for 3079th Aviation Depot Wing, at < www.3084adg.us>.
23 Author’s survey of Operational Storage Sites E A SY (former Caribou AFS) and
ITEM (former Stony Brook AFS).
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Transport Squadron (Special) at Kelly a f b , Texas ; and the 7th
Air Transport Squadron (Special) at Robins a f b in Georgia. Each
squadron was equipped with 15 modified C-124 Globemaster II fourengined wide-body transports, manned by specially-trained crews
who could protect the weapons and stow them so “as not to create
an incipient radiation problem amongst the weapons radioactive
materials.”24 The 3079th Aviation Depot Wing was disbanded
in 1962 and the three Air Transport Squadrons (Special) became
“Logistics Support Squadrons,” retaining their original numerical
designations. The three squadrons were then concealed within the
62nd Air Transport Wing (Heavy) to lower their profile as there were
some 400 other C-124 aircraft in the u s a f ’ s airlift inventory.
B y 1960, the system for handling nuclear weapons was mature
and there was regular traffic between the production facilities, storage
sites, and interceptor squadrons. At this time the F-89J was replaced
with the F-106A Delta Dart and F-101B Voodoo. The F-106A carried
one MB-1 Genie and a new missile, the Falcon G AR -11, also nuclear
capable. The F-101B carried two MB-1 Genies.25 The nuclear Falcon
could be loaded five to a cell in the Multi-Cubicle Magazine Storage
buildings which meant that one building could house one squadron’s
worth of these weapons.26

FROM ARROW TO VOODOO, 1 9 5 8 - 6 0

The r c a f still had its CF-100 force deployed but with conventional
armament, the chances of successfully engaging Soviet bombers were
low. n o r a d doctrine focused on fighting the air battle as far north
and away from population centres and s a c bases as possible. The s a c
base complex at this time included a line of bases from Montana to
Maine, within 50 miles of the Canadian border. An agreement was
struck so that US Air Force interceptors equipped with MB-1 Genies
could operate in Canadian airspace under certain conditions.27
The agreement stipulated that “ [USAF] planes so armed will enter

24 < www.usaf-nav-history.com/Stories/nucnavs.html> “Air Transport Nuclear Navs.”
25 Marcel Size Knaack, Post-World War II Fighters 1945-1973 (Washington DC :
Office of US Air Force History, 1986), 150-154, 208-221.
26 FOIA, “ADC Historical Study No. 20, “Nuclear Armament : Its Acquisition,
Control and Application to Manned Interceptors 1951-1963.”
27 Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 64-65.
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Canadian air space only in the event an air defence warning yellow
or red is declared. In such an event the USA planes will confine their
activities in the main to Canadian territory bordering the Great
Lakes and extending northwards to about 50 degrees north latitude.”
MB-1 equipped interceptors “will be authorized by the Canadian
government to land or take off from Canadian bases in the territory
over which they have to operate.”28 This was an interim measure
until the CF-105 Arrow squadrons, equipped with nuclear weapons,
became available.
The need for Canadian access to nuclear weapons was bolstered by
a 1958 n o r a d threat assessment. The predominant scenario consisted
of “two types of attacks against this continent - in 1960 the attack
will be a manned attack by infiltration to achieve surprise aimed at
the strike force of s a c . This will be followed within 8 to 24 hours by a
mass raid over the North Pole of again manned bombers against both
s a c bases and centres of population.” It was understood in n o r a d
after Sputnik that missiles would become the preeminent strategic
weapon, but not before 1965. After that, the “threat is envisaged as
a surprise attack by i c b m ’ s attacking primarily s a c bases and missile
sites, followed again by a mass raid of manned bombers over the
Pole.”29 n o r a d envisioned a layered air defence consisting of manned
fighters, area defence missiles, and point defence missiles.
Within weeks of the 1958 n o r a d threat assessement, the Canadian
Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Hugh Campbell, requested a
study of r c a f nuclear weapons requirements. The focus of the study
was on MB-1 weapons and the CF-105. The study posited two to four
MB-1s per Arrow for a total of 560 to 1000 MB-1s.
Other nuclear weapons for which the r c a f will have a requirement if
present air defence proposals are approved are Bomarc and perhaps a
nuclear warhead [for] Sparrow II or a G AR 1Y air-to-air guided missile
with a nuclear warhead. The total number of Bomarc missiles is 120
though no decision has been taken as to whether all of these will have
nuclear warheads.2
30
9
2
8

28 LAC RG 24 vol.112 096 107.4.v.1, 22 February 1957, “message CANAIRHED to
CANAIRDEF.”
29 DHH, The Max Hendrick Papers, Daily Diary, 30 May 1958.
30 ATI (25 July 1958) Aide Memoire for Chief of the Air Staff, “Requirements for
Nuclear Weapons.”
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The CF-105 project was cancelled in February 1959. At that time
the American Bom arcs were slowly becoming available. The first
F-106A squadron deployed to Gieger a f b in Washington in May 1959
with a rapid build up to 275 aircraft by late 1960. The first F-101B
squadron stood up at Otis a f b in Massachusetts on 5 January 1959,
with 17 squadrons deployed by December 1960.31 W ith no CF-105
and thus no nuclear capability, Canada was essentially defended by
American. The Diefenbaker government’s inability to accept that
Canada needed nuclear weapons to maintain sovereignty led to a
variety of policy gyrations that substantially delayed the proper
force structure and participation in the n o r a d air defence plan.32
After the CF-105 cancellation, the Eisenhower administration
took steps to request that nuclear weapons be stored at Goose Bay
and Stephenville for the u s a f F-106A squadrons operating there.33
This played into the rapidly building policy morass and slowed
progress down on all fronts as anti-nuclear elements in External
Affairs generated linkage between those weapons and an existing
Goose Bay storage issue relating to Strategic Air Command dating
back to 1950.
Air defence commanders on both sides of the border, who were
dealing with real threats generated by an decreasingly stable global
environment over Berlin, met to have discuss a ‘cross servicing
policy’ between the u s a f a d c and the r c a f a d c . These arrangements
permitted “the recovery and turn-around of U SAF A D C aircraft at
R C A F stations.”34 Nothing was mentioned regarding weapons and
armament but the implications of this precautionary measure are
obvious in light of the previous 1957 MB-1 overflight arrangement.
Eventually the Diefenbaker government agreed to acquire the
F-101B Voodoo in March 1961. In the interim, however, there were
discussions regarding the aircraft’s nuclear capability and Canadian
requirements. The r c a f was prepared to establish five F-101B Voodoo
squadrons with 60 aircraft. A total of 312 MB-1s were required to

31 Knaack, Post-World War II Fighters 1945-1973, 150-154, 217-218.
32 Again, this is discussed in great detail in the author’s Learning to Love the Bomb:
Canada’s Cold War Strategy and Nuclear Weapons 1951-1970 (Dulles : Potomac
Books, 2007).
33 DHH Raymont Collection, file 996, message External Ottawa to Washington DC,
“Storage of Defensive Nuclear Weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base.”
34 DHH file 79/429 vol.10 (19 Feb 1960) AM TS Divisional Items of Interest.
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equip this force “based on a U SAF formula of 2.6 sorties per aircraft
with 2 MB-1s being carried per aircraft.”35
The issue now revolved around the Diefenbaker government’s
policy backtracking on nuclear weapons. Believing that Canada could
punch above her weight and play a role in global disarmament talks,
elements in the government convinced the Prime Minister to not agree
to sign the necessary agreements with the United States to access
nuclear weapons for Bom arc and other systems.36 At the same time,
however, Cabinet agreed to initiate those negotiations, stipulating
that “preparations should continue to enable the Canadian forces to
have the vehicles, missiles, bases, training and other requirements to
enable them to be ready to use nuclear weapons to be acquired from
the United States under joint control arrangements if and when the
adoption of these weapons is considered necessary.”37
The r c a f was now confronted with mounting a crash programme
to accept the CF-101B Voodoo and the Bom arc into its force
structure. It was not simply a matter of taking possession of 60
aircraft and 60 missile airframes. They needed bases, maintenance
programmes, communications and command and control systems.
As nuclear weapons were integral to their operational capability, the
specialized aspects of these three elements needed to be understood.
Unfortunately, access to the specifics of that American information
was not possible without a signed agreement. The r c a f was forced
to use all of its resources to develop what amounted to speculation
about was required in these three areas for the interceptors to be
nuclearized if the government signed off on the agreement. This took
place while trouble was again brewing over Berlin.

RCAF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE GROUNDWORK, 1 9 6 1 - 6 2

The last half of 1961 was a scramble to integrate the C F - io iB ’s and
Bom arc into the r c a f . Within days of the decision to acquire the
Voodoos, the chief of the air staff was informed that “Agreement on

35 ATI (3 November i960) COR to VCAS, “Aide Memoire R CAF Requirements for
Nuclear Weapons.”
36 ATI (25 November i960) message External Ottawa to Washington DC,
“Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons.”
37 ATI (6 December i960) Record of Cabinet Decision, “Nuclear Weapons Policy.”
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a basic plan for positioning warheads on R C A F Bom arc bases was
reached between the U SAF and R C A F in March 1961 and has been
the basis of R C A F and USAF preparatory actions.” That led to
advanced movement with the US Air Force Special Weapons Center
to implement nuclear command and control systems in North Bay.38
This “working agreement” passed some but not all information
on “minimal control, custody and security requirements” for the
Bom arc bases so they could be constructed.39 It was “recommended
that agreement and approval of the technical specifications and
programme implications be pursued through channels now existing
between the Bom arc System Project Office [section redacted].”40
Indeed, as the Air Member for Technical Services noted later, “You
will recall that this type of information in respect of Bomarc was
obtained in the form of a draft annex to the Bom arc Operational
Employment Plan. This annex, incidentally, contains much more
than construction information and is in effect the technical agreement
or technical agreement that would be concluded as a supplementary
agreement to any general agreement on the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by the R C A F .”41
One important item in the back channel was the specifications
for the Bom arc warhead security and maintenance building. The
detailed aspects of this structure gave away a lot of Restricted
Data information on the warhead itself,42 so what was passed to the
Canadians was a sketch labeled “Floor Plan for Canadian Ordnance
Facility.”43 This crucial piece of information allowed a head-start on
construction.
Long line communications were established between the two
Canadian Bom arc sites and facilities in the United States. The La
Macaza site was connected to the n o r a d s a g e Direction Center in
Bangor, Maine. The North Bay site was connected to a similar site

38 ATI (11 October 1961) memo to CAS, “Lead Times-Nuclear Weapons Systems.”
39 ATI (11 April 1961) memo to CCE, “Bomarc-Facilities Related to Installing
Nucler Warheads at North Bay and La Macaza.”
40 ATI (7 April 1961) CAS to Air Member CJS(W) “Bomarc-Facilities and Support
for Nuclear Warheads.”
41 ATI (24 November 1961) memo AM TS to CAS, “Nuclear Weapons-CF101B.”
42 This conclusion is based on the author’s survey of the North Bay Bomarc
site, specifically the warhead maintanence building. The markings on the walls
alone convey what would have been Atomic Energy Commission Secret-Formerly
Restricted Data.
43 Sketch acquired under ATI.
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The Douglas M B-1 Genie served for nearly twenty years as Canada’s main nuclear air defence
weapon. [National Museum of Nuclear Science and History]

located in Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. Most important, the North
Bay site established a “logistics circuit” with Griffiss Air Force Base
in Rome, New York.44 The estimate was that in two weeks data could
flow between North Bay and the Sault Ste. Marie Direction Centre
once everything was hooked up.45 At the same time there was a
meeting at Hill Air Force Base, Utah to finalize the Bom arc logistics
support plan.46
Air Marshal Hugh Campbell, however, was agitated about the
lack of access to warheads “in view of the circumstances ... as well
as the dangerous international situation we now face.” He was blunt
with Minister of National Defence Douglas Harkness: “On or about 1
May 62 the North Bay Bom arc squadron will be fully operational if
warheads have been provided. If no warheads are available this unit
will be useless.” As for the C F 101B, “Without its nuclear armament
[line redacted] From an over-all North American point of view, the
destruction of any number of bombers short of their targets would
be worthwhile, but nevertheless the situation is unsatisfactory in that
the kill [line redacted]. This is clearly a waste of a most expensive

44 DHH file 79/429 vol.10 (14 April 1961) Divisional Items of Interest.
45 DHH file 79/429 vol.10 (28 April 1961) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest.
46 DHH file 79/429 vol.10 (21 April 1961) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest.
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interceptor and therefore patently unpalatable to the [line redacted].”
Campbell was likely referring to the high probability of destruction
of the interceptor and its crew if they tried to shoot down a Soviet
bomber loaded with barometrically-fused nuclear weapons, and then
detonated by some form of ‘dead hand’ system as the aircraft lost
altitude.47
But where should the incoming C F -io iB ’s be based? And what
special facilities were needed for handling M B-i Genies, if Canada
got access to them? With the Bom arc sites under construction, the
r c a f refocused on the Voodoo problem. The Director of Armament
Engineering was told that the Voodoo bases “from which it is intended
to scramble the aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard” were Comox,
BC; North Bay; Uplands (Ottawa); Bagotville and Val d’Or, Quebec;
and Chatham, New Brunswick.48
In July 1961, a u s a f mobile training team came to r c a f Station
Uplands two days before the first C F -io iB ’s were supposed to arrive.
u s a f transport aircraft from Hill a f b
brought spare parts while
another aircraft from Griffiss a f b delivered “loose equipment.”49 u s a f
personnel from Hill a f b arrived at Uplands and North Bay to discuss
details of various procedures. Word arrived that Bom arc missiles for
446 Surface-to-Air Missile Squadron in North Bay would come off
the production line in October. Boeing technicians installed them on
24 November i9 6 i.B0
Meanwhile, n o r a d asked r c a f Air Defence Command to do its
utmost to achieve “increased effectiveness during the present period
of tension” in the fall of i96i as the Berlin Crisis got worse and the
Soviets airdropped and detonated the largest thermonuclear weapon
ever conceived.51 On i2 October, i i C F -io iB ’s arrived in Canada,
some months later than originally scheduled. r c a f pilots, some of
who were already training with US Air Force F -io iB squadrons,
started to work up the newcomers at Namao. r c a f C-i30 and C -ii9
transports flew to American sites and airlifted material for the CFio iB programme to r c a f Station Comox.52 r c a f Station Uplands4
12
0
5
9
8
7

47 ATI (8 May ig6i) lett CAS to MND, “Lead Times-Nuclear Weapons System.”
48 ATI (23 June ig6i) memo, Acting DarmEng to DAProg.
49 DHH file 79/429 vol.io (2i July ig6i) AM TS Divisional Items of Interest.
50 DHH file 79/429 vol.io (i5 September ig6i) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest;
DHH file 79/429 vol.io (9 December i96i) AM TS Divisional Items of Interest.
51 DHH file 79/429 vol.io (i5 September i96i) AM TS Divisional Items of Interest.
52 DHH file 79/429 vol.io (2o October i96i) AM TS Divisional Items of Interest ;
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finally received its first C F 101B Voodoos in December. r c a f
transports also picked up 85 conventional G A R 2A missiles from the
Hughes plant in Tucson, Arizona, and the six available aircraft were
armed by 18 December.53
The lack of Quick Reaction Alert (q r a ) areas and special
ammunition storage (s a s ) sites presented the main problem for the
Canadian aircraft. The MB-1 required highly specialized security,
communications, and maintenance facilities. The Bom arc project
office was willing to bend the rules for the Canadians, but the r c a f
did not yet have the same leverage for the CF-101B. Those back
channels had to be activated all over again. The Air Member for
Technical Services informed the Chief of the Air Staff that “we think
we have enough information to undertake preliminary design of the
buildings [but] our architectural staff has some unsatisfied queries.”54
The need to get the CF-101B force programme moving now
outpaced Treasury Board’s ability to respond to the r c a f ’ s confused
request for funds. Somehow, the funding priority for the s a s and q r a
sites was allocated Category C instead of Category A. Category A
included items like married quarters drainage at r c a f Station Moose
Jaw. It took an irate Chief of the Air Staff’s intervention to right this
error.55 Indeed, Campbell ordered his staff to assemble a detailed case
for presentation to the minister for the possibility of deploying MB-1
for the CF-101B’s at r c a f Station Uplands (Ottawa) in February
1962. This was labeled a ‘paper exercise’ to see what could be done
and how long it would actually take. It was likely not a happy new
year for the staff.56

“e m e r g e n c y

c o n d it io n s ” : spr in g

1962

While the r c a f beavered away, the anti-nuclear elements in the
Diefenbaker government continued to delay the signing of the formal
nuclear weapons agreement with the United States. While preparing

DHH file 79/429 vol.10 (3 November 1961) AM TS Divisional Items of Interest.
53 DHH file 79/429 vol.10 (9 Dec 61) AM TS Divisional Items of Interest; DHH file
79/429 vol.10 (15 December 1961) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest.
54 ATI (24 November 1961) memo AM TS to CAS, “Nuclear Weapons - CF101B.”
55 ATI (21 November 1961) memo CAS to VCAS, “Nuclear Weapons - 101B.”
56 ATI (29 December 1961) memo D/VCAS to DPIM, “RCAF and Nuclear
Armament.”
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material to for the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, Air
Chief Marshal Frank Miller, to make the case to Minister of National
Defence Douglas Harkness, Campbell suddenly realized that
“somebody might mention to the Minister the possibility of nuclear
warheads for both the Bom arcs and the MB-1s remaining in storage
at selected points [line redacted] to be available for deployment to
Canada under emergency conditions only.”57
The acting Vice Chief of the Air Staff dismissed the problem,
asserting that “We all know that there would be an unacceptable time
requirement in doing this, but the C A S wishes it to be spelled out.”58
And it was. Campbell explained to Miller that there were several
factors in providing Bom arc with nuclear warheads. A ll nuclear
warheads were individually numbered and under the control of the
Atomic Energy Commission and subject to their rules, regulations
and safety procedures. Additionally, there were only two special
transport squadrons to move weapons around so it would take ninety
days for the Bom arc sites to be ready.59 Most important:
It is obvious that the technicians who handle and fuse the atomic
warheads must be very highly trained and their skills must be kept up
to date through constant practice at live sites. During an emergency in
which the Air Defence forces of North America might be involved these
people would be in great demand by the USAF. We could hardly expect
the United States under such conditions of national alert to consent to
an arrangement as outlined the provision of the necessary personnel and
air transport capability on a standby basis without positive assurance
they would be able to perform a useful military function would only
tend to degrade, if not weaken the USAF effort.60

Campbell concluded that “the separation of the nuclear warheads
from their vehicles by any great distance is simply not acceptable as
a military operation.”61

57 ATI (22 January 1962) memo AVCS to CplansI, “Nuclear Weapons.” The
ridiculously redacted line is “in the USA.”
58 Ibid.
59 DHH Raymont Collection file 303, (16 February 1962) memo CAS to CCOS,
“Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons-Bomarc.”
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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Yet, did the r c a f explore the options with their counterparts?
From the available sources, the answer is no. And they had their
information on the special air transport squadrons wrong: there were
three of them, not two. W hat is clear is that Campbell and Miller did
not want to give the Diefenbaker government an easy, but risky, way
out of the dilemma the politicians themselves created.

NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE VOODOOS, 1962

The 1961 list of potential operating locations for the r c a f Voodoos
remained in play until better information on where the squadrons
fit into n o r a d planning became available. The first issue related to
the Quick Reaction Alert (q r a ) facilities. A q r a facility consisted
of a pair of hangers connected by living quarters for the pilots and
ground crew situated on a special concrete extension attached to the
runway of an air base or airfield. The size of these facilities depended
upon the level of alert deemed necessary and feasible to react to a
Soviet air threat.
norad
determined the capacity for the new Canadian q r a
facilities. Each squadron assigned to n o r a d had to maintain a pair
of interceptors equipped with non-nuclear weapons on five-minute
alert for an identification sortie. This was usually a “peacetime”
event. There were then three alert levels: Alpha, Bravo and Charlie.
Alpha,the normal level of alert, called for a pair of nuclear-armed
aircraft on 15 minute alert. Bravo had six nuclear-armed aircraft
on 15 minute alert. Charlie, or maximum alert, placed all combatready aircraft on five minute alert. At that point the existence of
the q r a facility was moot. Canadian requirements, therefore, were
determined to be a shelter for a pair of aircraft on 15-minute alert
with “hard stands” for four aircraft on fifteen minute alert.62
In practice, the distinctive “Y ” shaped hardstands were equipped
with four enclosed shelters, each of which contained a pair of CF101B’s, two conventionally-armed for identification sorties and two
with M B-1’s, plus additional ramp space for the Bravo-level aircraft.63

62 ATI (24 January 1962) memo A/VCAS to AMTS, “Nuclear Weapons - CF101B
Aircraft.”
63 Author’s site survey of former R CAF QRA facilities at North Bay and Uplands.
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facilities were located at Comox, North Bay, Uplands, Bagotville,
Val d’Or, St. Hubert and Chatham.64
The r c a f at this juncture was still sorting out the operational
concept, which was very different from that for the CF-100. In the
new scheme, there were going to be five CF-101B squadrons deployed
as follows:
qra

409 Squadron:
410 Squadron:
414 Squadron:
416 Squadron:
425 Squadron:

Comox
Uplands
North Bay
Chatham
Bagotville

In January 1962, the r c a f concluded that “The location of
Uplands, in a major Canadian target area, precludes its use as a
base for CF-101B aircraft immediately [if] war is imminent or has
commenced.”65 What to do? There was Val d’Or, an austere remote
forward operating location in central Quebec. Establishing facilities
for a whole squadron and its personnel and dependents would be an
ambitious and costly undertaking. The pressure, however, was on to
get proposals through Treasury Board so q r a facilities and special
ammunition storage sites were programmed for both Uplands and
Val d’Or.
The next hurdle was the nature and layout of the s a s sites.
Here the US Atomic Energy Act and the lack of a government-togovernment agreement stymied the r c a f . Like the Bom arc sites,
warhead maintenance had to be carried out by an American custodial
detachment in a secure facility. r c a f attempts to activate back
channels similar to those used for the Bom arc warhead maintenance
building became problematic in 1962, but not for reasons of secrecy.
The drawings for the existing standard u s a f Multi-Cubicle
Magazine Storage (m c m s ) buildings were duly delivered to r c a f
architects and engineers sometime before May 1962. The Canadians
learned on the back channel, however, that the m c m s was now
considered obsolete and there were safety concerns. A new design was
winding its way through the labyrinthine bureaucratic bowels of the

64 Author’s survey of former QRA sites using Google Earth.
65 ATI (24 January 1962) memo A/VCAS to AMTS, “Nuclear Weapons-CF101B
Aircraft.”
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A Special Am m unition Storage facility was constructed at RCAF Station North Bay and was
earmarked for use during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. [Author]

Defense Atomic Support Agency and Joint Services Explosives Safety
Board in the United States. The new design was not approved yet
and its dimensions were still classified as Formerly Restricted Data.66
In effect, the Americans were changing the standard at exactly
the time that the r c a f was in the process of implementing s a s sites.
But Canada could not obtain the latest essential information because
the Diefenbaker government continued to stall on the agreement
that would give them detailed access. This state of affairs led to
a construction anomaly at r c a f bases associated with CF-101B
operations. The first two bases expected to get Voodoos were Uplands
and North Bay. Using what information they had, r c a f engineers
constructed special ammunition storage sites at both bases. These
were unique Canadian-designed facilities. The Uplands s a s had two
large rectangular bunkered magazines and a smaller bunker with five
door-bays, each large enough to contain two Genie MF-9 trailers.
The fourth building was a missile maintenance building equipped
with drive through doors, a second large bunkered room, and a large

66 ATI (14 June 1962) memo D/AMTS to CCE, “ CF101B Program-QRA and
SAS Special Armament Facilities” ; (17 May 1962) CCOS to CCJS(W), “ CF101B
Program-Arrangements for Special Weapons.” See also ATI (8 June 1962) message
CANAIRWASH to CANAIRHED, “Special Purpose Explosive Storage.”
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rail system for moving larger heavy objects from the drive-through
area to the large room. The North Bay site possessed only the two
rectangular magazines and it appears as though construction was
halted before the other two structures could be built.67
While the North Bay and Uplands facilities were under
construction, however, the planning on where Val d’Or fit into the
operational scheme was finalized. Val d’Or, with its forward location,
was ideally suited to taking on the brunt of any air attack directed
at the target complexes in the “Niagara Triangle.” The initial idea
was to maintain a pair of C F -io iB ’s on alert with minimal first-line
maintenance until proper s a s facilities could be completed.68
The follow-on concept looked towards maintaining a Voodoo
squadron at Uplands and then deploying it to Val d’Or on an alert to
augment the alert aircraft stationed there. By July 1962 this concept
solidified whereby squadrons at North Bay and Uplands would
share this commitment. The Val d’Or alert aircraft would handle
identification flights with no M B -is aboard. Whatever squadron was
not providing the identification aircraft would maintain four aircraft
on 15 minutes alert loaded with M B-i. Once the s a s facilities were
built at Val d’Or, four would be on alert there, while four Voodoos
would remain on nuclear alert at either North Bay or Uplands.69

DEADLOCK, 1962

The Diefenbaker government’s indecision on signing the warhead
access agreement was starting to wear on the r c a f leadership by the
late summer of 1962. This was “an impossible situation,” according
to Air Commodore E.M. Reyno, in a long letter to the Vice Chief of
the Air Staff:
One of the principle reasons why the Government will not agree to
accepting special weapons, rightly or wrongly, is that there is a large
body of public opinion in Canada which wants Canada to remain out

67 Author’s survey of former SAS facilities at CFB North Bay and Ottawa
International Airport.
68 ATI (21 August 1962) DAPorg to DCE, “Nuclear Weapon Planning - Val d ‘Or.”
69 ATI (26 July 1962) CAS to AOC ADC, “ Operational Posture Location of 410
Squadron.”
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of the “nuclear club.” This group opinion will be respected even more
in the future because of the Government’s current minority opinion in
the House.70

Reyno wanted to mount a publicity campaign to counter this
thinking with facts. The weapons were defensive in nature, air
defence was part of the deterrent system, and “The only means of
destroying an enemy bomber with a load of special weapons on board
and without subjecting ourselves to fall-out danger is to ‘cook’ it with
a nuclear weapon high in the air.”
Reyno’s frustration echoed that of the rest of the r c a f :
We have sat with the present situation long enough in my opinion, and
in spite of the fact that some of the best military writing I have ever
seen has gone forward to the Cabinet on behalf of the cause and we are
even worse off now than we were five years ago - because people are
laughing at us now because we have carriers but no weapons.71

Reyno told his superiors:
[I] know the CAS discussed ‘Defensive Weapons’ with the Minister but
the publicity campaign idea didn’t catch on. The former CAS wouldn’t
buy the idea we should help the gov’t out of a dilemma of its own
making, I still think we should.72

Campbell approached Harkness on the issue on 19 August 1962 and
argued that, “the best one might hope for would be an eventual
agreement that would involve storage of the warheads in the
United States, for transfer to Canada in an emergency.”73 Campbell
emphatically noted that Canada “must also be prepared to consider
returning the Bom arcs and F-101B interceptors to the United States
and, in effect, turning over the air defence of Canada to [section
redacted].”74 The redacted section likely referred to American Air
Defense Command’s interceptors.

70
71
72
73

ATI (1 August 1962) memo A/VCAS to VCAS “Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons.”
Ibid.
Ibid. See minute #7.
ATI (10 August 1962) CAS to MND, “Nuclear Weapons for Air Defence.”
Ibid.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2014

25

Canadian Military History, Vol. 23 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 3

There were potentially lethal dangers associated with an emergency "just in time delivery"
policy. This is the remains o f a US A ir Force C -124 Globemaster II transport carrying three
M k 39 bombs that crashed near Barksdale A ir Force Base in 1959. [National Museum of Nuclear
Science and History]

Air Marshal Miller provided a detailed treatise to Harkness that
remains unavailable to the public. In effect Miller explained that
“Such a belief must, it would seem, be based on the idea that there
is nothing basically different in the handling procedures required for
a nuclear warhead as compared say, to an artillery shell... . This, of
course is not the case.” Miller implies that emergency airlift “could
be dangerous to our own forces or population.”75
The main issue in a “just in time” emergency delivery scenario,
Miller explained, was time. “[A]n attack could come at anytime and
with little warning, possibly as little as one hour or even less.” As
a result, “it is the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff that storage of the
warheads on other than the bases from which they would be used
does not make military sense [paragraph redacted].” In the strongest
possible language, Miller asserted “The possession of the carriers
without the armament to exploit them properly weakens the entire
North American defence system and also exposed Canada and the
Canadian armed forces to ridicule.”76

75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
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In the wake of this impasse, the Air Council unilaterally decided
to make six CF-101B’s of the Operational Training Unit at r c a f
Namao (Edmonton) “combat ready.” Should they tell the Chiefs of
Staff Committee first and wait for the government to sign the access
agreement? Or should they get c o s c approval, and then make a
“formal application to the US Air Force under the canopy of the
existing Cabinet directive respecting the preparedness of nuclear
weapons systems?” Six CF-101B’s were placed on a “Ready” status.77
At the same time, ten Bom arc missiles arrived at La Macaza
on 15 September and communications and integration tests were
underway between La Macaza and the Bangor Air Defence Sector’s
SAGE computer. 425 Squadron assumed n o r a d alert status on 1
October while 414 Squadron was in the process of redeploying to
North Bay. This was on the eve of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND EMERGENCY ACCESS

The details of Canada’s response to the Cuban Missile Crisis are
available in two other works.78 For our purposes however, this section
focuses on the issue of the air defence system’s readiness. On 24
October, deputy commander-in-chief n o r a d , Air Chief Marshal Roy
Slemon, contacted r c a f Air Defence Command and informed them
that c i n c n o r a d , wearing his American “hat” placed the American
component of n o r a d , the Continental Air Command and thus US
Air Force Air Defense Command at Defence Condition (d e f c o n )
3, weapons status Delta. Wearing his coalition command “hat” he
now asked Canada for three things : to please move the r c a f a d c
status to the equivalent level of alert; disperse the interceptor force;
and that “ n o r a d should be allowed to bring in nuclear weapons if
necessary into Canada and start the arming process.”79 As Slemon
later recounted,
It was obviously vital to take preventative action before the Cuban
missiles became operational with nuclear warheads, the timing of

77 DHH file 76/264 (29 August 1962) Air Council Minutes.
78 Peter Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered
(Toronto: CISS, 1993) and Maloney, Learning to Love The Bomb.
79 Hendrick Papers, “ Conversation between VCAS and AOC ADC, October 25 1962.”
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which was exceedingly difficult to determine or forecast precisely. If the
missiles had become operational, it takes little imagination to visualize
the blackmail, pressures and threats to which we all would have been
subjected.... Foremost in the minds of all of us, or course, was the
real danger that the Russians, when suddenly confronted openly with
the knowledge that their big Cuban venture was collapsing, might, in
frustration, react in some lunatic manner against the North American
continent. This grave possibility demanded that our NORAD defences
be readied.808
3
12
Miller met with Diefenbaker, Green, and Harkness. “They didn’t
even touch the question,” according to a report of the meeting, “they
just looked at it and bowed away from the question of nuclear tips.”
Miller contacted Slemon at n o r a d h q in Colorado and told him “we
really didn’t go anywhere on that.” Miller recommended that c i n c
n o r a d put in a request to the Canadian government “to allow the
arming of the F-102 squadron at Goose Bay with G A R 11’s and
a detachment at Harmon” to “introduce the subject.” An official
request arrived in minutes.81
The Chiefs of Staff Committee met with Harkness. Campbell
suggested that more and better information on how quickly the
Bom arcs and CF-101B’s could be armed be acquired. During that
time the d e f c o n in the United States changed to d e f c o n 2 for
Strategic Air Command and certain naval forces. Harkness went to
Diefenbaker who reluctantly agreed to place Canadian air defence
forces on the equivalent of d e f c o n 3.82
After further communication, Slemon “at his own initiative called
up about an hour later” and told the r c a f leadership that the fastest
way of arming was to have the r c a f C F -io iB ’s “come down and be
armed at American bases. We could do that, and we think it could
be done quite quickly.”83 Slemon relayed American concerns that “to
put a capability up in Canada of arming them up on Canadian bases
would take a great deal of work because the key problem would be
the training of the technicians.” As for the Bom arcs, “they reckoned

80 DHH Raymont Collection file 2503, “Extract from Personal Letter 3 March 1965
from Air Marshal Slemon to General Foulkes.”
81 Hendrick Papers, “ Conversation between VCAS and AOC ADC, October 25 1962.”
82 NAC MG 32 (B19) Vol.57, Douglas Harkness, “The Nuclear Arms Question and
the Political Crisis Which Arose from It In January and February 1963.”
83 Hendrick Papers, “ Conversation between VCAS and AOC ADC, October 25 1962.”
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This is a C F -101B in a Q uick Reaction Alert facility equipped with Falcon air-to-air missiles
sometime in the early 1960s before M B -1 Genies were stored in Canada. [Department of
National Defence]

that within six days of any starting time zero they could have half
a squadron capability and within nine days the Bom arc squadron
could fully operations for nuclear tips.”84
At some point after this temporary MB-1 storage areas were
delineated at CF-101B bases, though these weapons were not
deployed to them from American storage sites. As for the Bom arcs, a
number of W 40 warheads were flown into North Bay on u s a f C-124
transports and were mounted in the missiles but their full capability
was not realized when the Cuban Missile Crisis wound down in late
October.85
Badly shaken by the crisis, the Diefenbaker government ministers
met and “unanimously agreed that we should at once reopen
negotiations with the United States.” Cabinet decided that “For the
weapons in Canada - the Bom arcs and the C F -io is - we were to try
to get an agreement under which the nuclear warheads, or essential

84 Hendrick Papers, “ Conversation between VCAS and AOC ADC, October 25 1962.”
85 This information was provided to the author by Lieutenant-General A. Chester
Hull.
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parts of them, would be held in the United States but could be put on
the weapons in Canada in a matter of minutes or hours.”86
Consulting with Slemon in n o r a d on 2-3 November while
Strategic Air Command remained at d e f c o n 287 and n o r a d forces
at d e f c o n 3 Weapons State Charlie,88 Chief of the Air Staff Larry
Dunlap looked at the arguments before briefing Harkness and Green.
The n o r a d staff’s response on the Bom arcs remains unnecessarily
restricted today but for the C F -io iB ’s the staff concluded that:
by flying CF101 aircraft to selected USAF bases, uploading with MB-is
and flying back to Canadian bases in an operational configuration [is] a
highly undesirable course of action to NORAD since it interferes with
and reduces the alert posture and the already marginal capability for
defence in depth; and could undesirably concentrate our limited forces
at a time when survival Dispersal measures might be implemented.89

These measures assumed “that the R C A F is trained and provided
with adequate equipment [redacted].” (This was likely related to
the loading equipment for the weapons). c i n c n o r a d felt “strongly
that the only posture which is justifiable is one that provides all
Bom arcs and all C F io is with an on-site quick reaction operational
capability.” And, not incidentally when one was dealing with nuclear
weapons, “crash action of the nature herein contemplated to provide
nuclear capability to the r c a f forces will generate weapons handling
risks greater than would be the case if Canadian policy now enabled
weapons to be on site in properly constructed facilities at appropriate
bases in Canada.”90
It is not clear how much Canadian military leaders or Canadian
politicians knew in ig62 about the nature and extent of US Air Force
experiences with nuclear accidents in the i95os. During that decade
there were i4 accidents involving bombers loaded with nuclear weapons

86 NAC MG 32 (Bi9) Vol.57, Douglas Harkness, “The Nuclear Arms Question and
the Political Crisis Which Arose from It In January and February i963.”
87 DHH Raymont Collection file 2503, (6 November i962) memo CGS to dl “States
of Readiness of US Forces.”
88 DHH Raymont Collection file 2503, (5 November i962) memo CGS to CCOS,
“Military Measures Taken During the Cuban Crisis.”
89 ATI (3 November i962) message CINCNORAD to CANAIRHED, personal to
Dunlap from Slemon.
90 Ibid.
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or components and two accidents involving C -i24’s belonging to the
3079th Aviation Depot Wing special transport squadrons carrying
nuclear weapons and components.91 Consequently, the American side
of n o r a d could speak with some authority on the dangers of hastily
transporting nuclear weapons.
Dunlap briefed high-level Canadian officials during the first
week of November. Emergency deployment “is a time consuming
process. The timings I shall give you are based on the most ideal
circumstances.” There was no existing training agreement: one
had to be signed first “to provide the basis for the retraining and
[redacted] so that these resources would be available on short notice
for movement to North Bay and LaM acaza and to provide for the
training of the r c a f element of the warhead loading crews” before
“strategic or tactical warning.” Then “at some stage in the period of
rising tension, a decision would have to be arrived at by the Canadian
Government to request the nuclear warheads - this to be followed by
an approach to the United States - this, in turn, by the issuance of
instructions by the [lines redacted].”92
Dunlap asked the most important question:
How much time is required for a decision to invite the United States
to send nuclear weapons to Canada? You are far better judges of that
than I. Let me merely say that, under certain circumstances of the day
or night [lines redacted] then to that you must add your estimate of the
time for a decision. For the purposes of this brief I will assume that this
total operation could be accomplished in 1 hour plus decision time.93

Then:
Once this action has been cleared, the US manpower and equipment
would have to marshaled, loaded into transport aircraft and [line
redacted] which the nuclear weapons are to be drawn. This is a time
consuming process under the best of conditions, even assuming that
airlift would be despatched without delay and that weather conditions

91 Ibid.
92 ATI (13 November 1962) memo CAS to dl, “Time Factors-Delivery of Nuclear
Weapons” and attached paper, “Nuclear Warheads : Time Factors Concerned with
Their Delivery.”
93 Ibid.
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are favourable ... and assuming that the air transport bases are within
30 minutes flying of the United States base where the nuclear load is
earmarked.94

Unfortunately the documents describing the process and timings
remain heavily redacted. Fortunately, however, Minister of National
Defence Douglas Harkness explained in his papers that
The amount of warning time which could be counted on for a Russian
air attack on North American was between two and three hours — thus
to be satisfactory a system of delivery and installation of the nuclear
warheads on Canadian weapons within two hours was essential. To
accomplish this a large number of aircraft and hundreds of men would
be required ... one which would seriously complicate the operation of
the American bases where the warheads were held ... In addition of the
weather conditions were bad, it might not work.95

Harkness concluded that
It was quite apparent that any such plan was impractical and far too
costly and the only purpose it would serve would be to enable the
Canadian Government to say no nuclear weapons were being held on
Canadian soil. This, however, appeared to be Howard Green’s chief
objective and he insisted on going over the times, men involved, and all
the other details at great length, evidently with the hope of convincing
himself and others that it was a workable scheme.96

An American team “went back home to see what essential parts of
the warheads, small in size, could be kept in the US and flown up in
an emergency [they] returned with a variety of schemes along these
lines which materially cut down the cost and improved the time, but
it was clear that none of them would provide a really satisfactory
solution.”97

94 Ibid.
95 NAC MG 32 (B19) Vol.57, Douglas Harkness, “The Nuclear Arms Question and
the Political Crisis Which Arose from It In January and February 1963.”
96 Ibid.
Ibid.
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Where were the weapons that were earmarked for Canadian
bases stored? The American bases that had nuclear weapons storage
and were within short flight range of Canadian bases were: Duluth;
K.I. Sawyer ; Kinchloe ; Wurtsmith ; Selfridge ; Griffiss ; Dow, and
Loring. The chart depicts the estimated storage space and the
aircraft types stationed at each base. The two bases that possessed
notable excess storage capacity were K.I. Sawyer (at least 30 spaces
for MB-1) and Griffiss (at least 60 spaces for MB-1). As for Loring
it is unclear whether there were three, four, or six 30-bay structures.
W 40 warheads, in their 55-gallon drum-like container, could easily
be stored in any “igloo” bunker and did not require climate control.
Griffiss, Wurtsmith, and Dow had this type of storage in location.
Both Selfridge and Kinchloe operated F-106 squadrons, which may
not have required all available 120 m c m s spaces.98
Out west the closest bases with nuclear storage to stations Comox,
Cold Lake and Namao were Gieger and McChord in Washington ;
Glasgow and Great Falls, Montana ; and Minot, North Dakota. A
healthy candidate to supply Comox is Geiger Field, with five buildings
and 150 spaces for a single F-106 squadron.99

RESOLVING THE PROBLEM, 1963

In mid-November 1962, a US Air Force team inspected the La
Macaza B o m a r c site run by 447 s a m Squadron. This inspection
“was completed successfully with no major discrepancies.”100 By
January 1963, the r c a f leadership determined that the B o m a r c and
CF-101B squadrons “can be made operational with nuclear weapons
very readily” even though the formal access agreement was not yet
signed.101
The new timelines for operational capacity were now 19 weeks
for the Bom arc sites and “no less that twelve months and possibly
as much as eighteen months” for the CF-101B force which was

98 This is based on the author’s survey of MCMS structures at former USAF ADC
interceptor bases.
99 Ibid.
100 DHH file 79/429 vol.12 (16 November 1962) AMTS Divisional Items of Interest.
101 ATI (18 January 1963) memo A/CAS to CplansI, “Nuclear Weapons : Time to
Become Operational After Agreement Signed.”
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“determined by either the construction time for the s a s and q r a
facilities or [line redacted]” and the length of construction season.
The frustrations within n o r a d were increasingly palpable as they
re-assessed the events of October 1962. By April 1963 a request for
acceptance of a fighter dispersal plan was mooted through lower level
channels. This was not an emergency dispersal plan and the idea
was to have nine squadrons deploy to Canadian air bases “on a
continuing basis.”102
Such a request would have been anathema to the Diefenbaker
government if they knew about it. At this point the relationship
between Diefenbaker and Kennedy was non-existent. Diefenbaker’s
behaviour towards Kennedy was so disproportionately poor that
Kennedy frequently used profanity and Diefenbaker’s name in the
same sentences to his advisors.103
In June 1963 Kennedy toured n o r a d h q where he was briefed by
Slemon. This included a 20-minute mock battle depicting an attack
on North America. The threat was based on 90 i c b m s , 20-30 missile
launching submarines and 200 bombers with nuclear weapons:
It commenced with the cutting of the BMEWS [Ballistic Missile Early
Warning System] Warning cable followed by a previous indication that
the Soviet Long Range Air Force had been launched in large numbers
and that there was an abnormal number of submarines concentrated
on the Southern Coast of the United States. The first hostile act was
the shooting down of an Early Warning aircraft of the Pacific barrier,
the next was a BMEWS warning which built up rapidly but before
impacts from these shots, which were aimed at all 4 quadrants could be
realized there were nuclear explosions on both coasts presumed to come
from submarines. As the battle built up the CinC contacted the Joint
Chiefs War Room and the Ottawa War Room, reported the situation,
indicated that he had increased his Alert to DEFCON 1, was flushing
his fighters and asked for reaffirmation on the use of nuclear weapons.
At the same time he advised SAC and CINCPAC [Commander-in
Chief Pacific] of the situation. The Joint War Room in the States and
Ottawa replied confirming the Presidential decision and the Canadian
Prime Ministers decision to carry on and at this point the Deputy CinC
[n o r a d ] brought the regions into the picture authorizing them to flush

102 DHH file 79/429 vol.12 (26 April 1963) AM TS Divisional Items of Interest.
103 DHH Hendrick Papers, ‘Presidential Visit to NORAD Headquarters, 8 June 1963.”
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and use their weapons. (It was this play which showed the regions were
not brought into the picture until some 4 minutes after the original
BMEWS warning, the time being taken for this high-level consultation
and validation). The next hostile review was penetration of the DEW
Line in large numbers with a predicted arrival in the [Zone of Interior]
of 2% hours later. The exercise was then compressed in time by 3 hours
and tracks were shown in large numbers along the Canada- US border
entering all Sectors. Regions were asked to report their status which
they did by telephone indicating that about % were operating from their
ALCOPs [alternate command post] showing what losses they had of
fighters on the ground and Bomarcs and NIKI [sic - NIKE] batteries
to the nuclear attack and indicated that their success rate against the
bombers was reasonable and that they had enough weapons to carry on.
At this point the exercise was completed.10410
5
c i n c n o r a d was “empowered to declare d e f c o n 1 based on tactical
evidence on the board and having done so he could declare objects
hostile based on circumstantial evidence or upon having obvious
hostile intent. Under the two conditions of d e f c o n 1 and a declaration
of an object as hostile he was authorized to shoot it down with
nuclear weapons once it penetrated US air space that is within the
3 mile limit.” 106
Given these timelines, the emergency measures discussed so
feverishly in November 1962 would not have been feasible. The level
of communications disruption brought on by the initial stages of an
attack would have made initiation of the process unlikely. In addition,
the flight characteristics of the C-124 Globemaster II must be taken
into account. “Old Shaky” was a large, slow, four-engine propeller
aircraft with a maximum speed of 300 miles per hour.106
The only alternative would have been to move warheads by air to
sites during the build-up of an international crisis. However, a Privy
Council Office assessment concluded that:

I believe that the crisis showed that it would have been very difficult
if not impossible to obtain nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in

104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 C-124 data comes from Boeing at : <http ://www.boeing.com/boeing/history/
mdc/globemaster.page>.
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a period of anticipated imminent attack. The main difficulty is the
reluctance to exacerbate a tense international situation and to alarm
opinion in Canada and abroad by taking such a step, which would
be widely understood as revealing that the Canadian Government
had good reason to believe, perhaps on secret evidence, that war was
imminence and unavoidable.107

During the course of Kennedy’s n o r a d visit, the Canadians reported:
there is some uncertainty as to exactly at what point the President
authorizes the general use of nuclear defensive weapons against hostile
objects. In practice DEFCON 1 would coincide with the general alerts
which would arouse both the civil population would bring into play the
retaliatory forces and course this would bring into play Presidential
approval for the use of strategic defensive forces. It is inconceivable that
DEFCON 1 would result in hostile action by Air Defence Command on
its own and it is in this respect the system is interlocked.108

had to work around the problem. Until the agreement was
signed in 1964, the plan called for deployment of 18 US Air Force
F - io iB ’s to Chatham, Bagotville, and North Bay when d e f c o n 1
was declared. At the service level, “It was agreed between General
Aghan and Air Marshal Harvey that in the event of a real flap
aircraft would deploy north loaded and south unloaded and if
time permitted there could be a ferry service using fighters to lift
the weapons dependent solely on the ground handling equipment
available on the Canadian bases. This plan would be a hip pocket
plan and not put in writing.”109
norad

CONCLUSION

By 1963 Special Ammunition Storage Sites were constructed at
Comox, BC, Val d ’Or and Bagotville, Quebec, and Chatham, New
Brunswick. These new facilities replaced the multi-cubicle munitions

107 DHH Raymont Collection file 2503, memo for Mr. Bryce, “Lessons of the Cuban
Missile Crisis.
108 Ibid.
109 DHH Hendrick Papers, Daily Diary 28 February 1964.
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storage buildings. There were two earth-covered buildings, each
containing two rows of seven special lockers. The three sites each
had approximately 28 lockers, storage for enough MB-1s to equip
14 aircraft in each r c a f CF-101B squadron.110 The two Canadian
Bom arc sites each had 28 missiles, with W 40 warheads uploaded
onto the airframes and a pair of spare warheads stored in the
warhead custodian’s building. The W 40s arrived by u s a f C-124 on
the night of 3 January 1964. By 1965 US Air Force C-i24s arrived
and handed over the MB-1 rockets with their W-25 warheads to the
425 Munitions Maintenance Squadron detachments at the CF-101B
bases. Emergency measures were, finally, no longer required.
In seeking to retain sovereignty, the Diefenbaker government
compromised it. The decisions boiled down to undermining the
larger deterrent system consisting of n o r a d and s a c for domestic
political consumption or accepting the technical and temporal
realities of nuclear air defence. That this debate took place during
the most dangerous nuclear crisis of the period seriously questions the
Canadian government’s competence. To have a nation’s air defence
effectively in the hands of a neighbour, even an ally, was too much
for the professional military leadership, and ultimately the Canadian
voting population, to stomach.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Sean M. Maloney is Associate Professor in History at Royal Military
College of Canada and served as the Historical Advisor to the Commander of
the Army for the war in Afghanistan. He previously served as the historian
for 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade, the Canadian Army’s primary Cold
War n a t o commitment after the re-unification of Germany and at the start
of Canada’s long involvement in the Balkans. Dr. Maloney has extensive
field experience in that region, particularly in Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo and
Macedonia from 1995 to 2001, where he inadvertently observed elements of
the nascent Al Qaeda organization. His work on the Balkans was interrupted
by the 9-11 attacks. From 2001, Dr. Maloney has focused nearly exclusively
on the war against the Al Qaeda movement and its allies, particularly on the
Afghanistan component of that war. He traveled regularly to Afghanistan
from 2003 to 2011 to observe and record coalition operations in that country
and was the first Canadian military historian to go into combat since the

110 Author’s survey of SAS facilities at Chatham, New Brunswick.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2014

37

Canadian Military History, Vol. 23 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 3

Korean War. He has authored twelve books, four of which deal with the
Afganistan war, as well as the controversial Canada and UN Peacekeeping:
Cold War by Other Means, 1946-1970 and Learning to Love the Bomb:
Canada’s Cold War Strategy and Nuclear Weapons 1951-1970.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol23/iss1/3

38

